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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JESSE ELIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 41477
Kootenai Co. Case No.
CR-2010-14353
RESPONDENT'S REPLY SRI
ON REVIEVV

-------------------------- )
ARGUMENT IN REPLY
This Court Should Reject Elias's Argument That Giving Meaning To The Term "Force"
In Idaho Code § 18-6608 Requires Engrafting The Consent Element From Forcible
Rape, I.C. § 18-6101 (4). Onto The Penetration Element Of Forcible Sexual Penetration
By Use Of A Foreign Object, I.C. § 18-6608
Elias challenges his conviction for forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign
object, arguing that, in order to give meaning to the term "force" in the forcible sexual
penetration statute, this Court must engraft the extrinsic force requirement from the
consent element of forcible rape onto the force requirement from the penetration
element of forcible sexual penetration.

(Response on

argument

1

The actus reus of rape requires two major elements:

First, the penetration,

however siight, of a vagina by a penis; second, non-consent, whether legal or factual.
The statute specifically provides that the state may show that the penetration was
legally nonconsensual by showing that the female victim is underage (I.C. § 18-6101 (1
and 2)); by showing that the she is incapable of giving legal consent through
unsoundness of mind (I.C. § 18-6101 (3)); or by showing that she was unable to resist
due to intoxication (I.C. § 18-6101 (5)). The state may show that the penetration was
factually nonconsensual by showing that the victim resisted but her resistance was
overcome by force or violence (I.C. § 18-6101 (4)); by showing that she was
unconscious of the act, either because she was asleep or because she was not
cognizant of the act (I. C. § 18-6101 (6)); by showing that she submitted under mistaken
beliefs (I.C. § 18-6101 (7 and 8)); or by showing that she was placed under duress (I.C.

§ 18-6101(9)).
Only forcible rape, I.C. § 18-6101 (4), where

perpetrator uses his penis to

cause the penetration, however slight, of the victim's vagina, and also uses force or
violence to overcome her resistance, requires application of the extrinsic force standard.
State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412,422,299 P.3d 219, 229 (2013). The reason it requires
the extrinsic force standard is because the "force sufficient to overcome the victim's
resistance" goes to a different element than the mere penetration of the victim's vagina
by the perpetrator's penis; it goes to the element of non-consent. See

at

1, 299

P.3d at 228 (citing State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 534 (1989)).
Similar to rape, the actus reus of forcible sexual
object requires two main elements: First, the
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by use of a

a

or

anus by anything but a penis; second, non-consent, whether legal or factual. The state
may show that the penetration was legally nonconsensual either because the victim was
intoxicated or because the victim was incapable of giving consent due to unsoundness
of mind. The state is not limited, however, in how it may show that the penetration was
factually nonconsensuaL The state must only show that the penetration was in fact
"against the victim's will" and, where factually nonconsensual, caused "by use of force
or violence or by duress, or by threats of immediate and great bodily harm,
accompanied by apparent power of execution." I.e. § 18-6608.
Unlike in the narrow crime of forcible rape, there is no requirement in the forcible
sexual penetration statute that the victim resist and that her resistance be overcome by
force or violence.

The extrinsic force standard articulated in Jones, which goes to

proving the element of non-consent by overcoming resistance, is entirely inapplicable
forcible sexual penetration.
forcible rape

Elias seeks to engraft the non-consent element from

the penetration element of forcible sexual penetration, but that is a

complete non sequitur. This Court should reject Elias's invitation to engraft the consent
element from forcible rape onto the penetration element of forcible sexual penetration.
Under the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-6608, the state is not required to
demonstrate
for forcible

the penetration was caused by "extrinsic force" to sustain a conviction
penetration because the state need not prove that the victim

and her resistance was overcome.

Rather, the state must only show that the

penetration was caused "by use of force."

use of force in forcible sexual penetration goes to penetration rather
than

resistance, use of the

"force" in Idaho Code § 18-6608 is
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analogous to how the same word is used in the battery statute, I.C. § 18-903(1)
(defining battery as the "[w]illful and unlawful use of
another").

or violence upon the person of

Jurors experience no apparent difficulty in applying the common

understanding of the term "force" when determining whether a battery has been
committed. Force, within the normal meaning of the word, is more than mere touching,
but less than violence. Applying the complicated legalistic definition of "extrinsic force"
to a term which is well within the common understanding of the average juror is not only
unnecessary and unhelpful, it defies the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-6608. This
Court should decline Elias's invitation to confuse the issue of "force" and instead
continue to apply the common understanding of that term.
Under the forcible sexual penetration statute, any nonconsensual penetration,
however slight, of the vagina or anus of a victim that is caused by something more than
mere touching is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of forcible sexual
penetration with a foreign object.

acknowledges

the evidence establishes that

he penetrated S.L.S.'s vagina with

finger. (Response on review, p.1.) There was

sufficient evidence presented at trial by which the jury could reasonably infer that S.L.S.
did not consent to the penetration, such as S.L.S. being asleep when Elias penetrated
her vagina and Elias having to break

her home at 3:00 a.m. in order to gain access

to S.L.S.

-p.52, L.10; p.74, Ls.2-10.) Likewise, there

, pAD, Ls.1

. p.51,

was sufficient evidence by which the jury could reasonably infer that Elias accomplished
the penetration by use of force-something more than mere touching-because the
caused S.L.S. pain and

(Tr., pA1, LS.1
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p.101,

18-23.)

In his response on review, Elias asserts that this argument seeks to prove the
cause (sexual penetration by use of force) from the effect (pain and injury). (Response
on review, pp.22-24.) Of course it does, because that is what an inference is. Elias's
argument misunderstands the sufficiency of the evidence standard.

Under the

sufficiency standard, it is well settled that juries "may draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence presented." State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788,
792 (2008) (citations omitted).

Indeed, drawing those reasonable inferences is the

exclusive province of the jury, for "[o]n appeal, where a defendant stands convicted, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and the reviewing court
is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003)

(citations omitted; emphasis added).

Where the effect of the sexual penetration is

painful and injurious, a jury may properly infer that the cause of the sexual penetration
was at least "force"-something more than mere touching.
The state has never argued that pain and injury are direct evidence, in and of
themselves, which conclusively prove that a sexual penetration was accomplished by
force or violence.

Rather, the state has consistently argued that pain and injury' are

evidence by which a

can reasonably

that the sexual penetration was

accomplished by force or violence.

Respondent's brief, p.8; Brief in support of

review, pp.5, 10.) Under the facts

this case, because Elias's penetration caused

S.L.S. pain and injury, there was sufficient evidence by which the jury could infer that
penetration was caused by force. To suggest, as Elias does in
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on

review, that pain and injury are not evidence whereby a jury could reasonably infer that
a sexual penetration was caused by force-something more than mere touching-is to
deny that force can cause pain and injury.1
When Elias broke into S.LS.'s house in the middle of the night, snuck up the
stairs to her bedroom where she lay sleeping between her two children, and inserted his
finger into her vagina causing her pain and injury, he committed the crime of forcible
sexual penetration by use of a foreign object

The jury's conviction of Elias for this

crime is supported by sufficient, competent evidence.

Elias's conviction should

therefore be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Elias's conviction and
sentence for

DATED this 1

sexual penetration.

day

January, 2013.

RUSSELLJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

1 Elias also argues that pain and injury are not evidence by which a jury can find force
because they can occur during consensual sexual penetration. (Response on review,
pp.23-24.) This argument is irrelevant. Consensual sexual penetration of a vagina or
regardless of how forceful or
it may be.
anus is not a crime in the State
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
that I have this 10th day of January, 2013, served a true
I HEREBY CERTI
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENY'S REPLY BRIEF ON REVIEW by
causing a copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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Deputy Attorney General
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